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THE ISRAELI DEMOLITION OF
PALESTINIAN HOUSES IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN
ANALYSIS OF ITS LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Martin B. Carroll*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Palestinian uprising in the Israeli Occupied Territories,
otherwise known as the Intifadah, has brought greater attention to
Israel's security measures. Specifically, the Intifadah has raised ques-
tions of the efficacy and legality of Israel's attempts to control the local
population by means criticized by many as overly heavy-handed. One
such practice employed by the Israelis is the demolition or sealing of
houses in which a resident is believed to have committed a political or
violent act against the interests of the State of Israel. The intent of this
paper is to examine the legality of the destruction of houses in the
Occupied Territories under the relevant articles of the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of August 12, 1949 [Geneva Convention IV] (hereinafter the Fourth
Geneva Convention).1
The standard Israeli practice in the past has been to demolish or
seal off a suspected terrorist's house immediately after the incident in
question occurs. 2 The demolitions almost invariably have been car-
ried out before the suspect has been tried or convicted.3 In a typical
* B.A. The University of Illinois, 1985; M.A. The London School of Economics and Polit-
ical Science, 1986; J.D. The University of Michigan, 1989. The author is currently an associate
at the Chicago law firm of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon.
1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of Au-
gust 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion IV]. The relevant Geneva provisions were adopted: along with three other treaties regarding
international standards in relation to acceptable conduct in times of war.
2. One example of the Israelis' quick response to acts of terrorism occurred when army per-
sonnel arrested a Palestinian suspected of stabbing an Israeli-appointed Arab mayor and immedi-
ately thereafter bulldozed his house in the Jelazoun refugee camp. Washington Post, July 11,
1988, at A13, A21. In 1984, the Israelis destroyed four houses in the Gaza Strip in reaction to
the hijacking of a public bus. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at Al. There are numerous other
examples of the Israelis demolishing houses immediately following the arrest of a suspected
terrorist.
3. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION, TREATMENT OF PALES-
TINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 68 (1978).
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demolition, soldiers normally give the occupants a short time, perhaps
as little as one hour, to remove their possessions from the house to be
destroyed. The property on which the demolished building was stand-
ing is often forfeited and the former occupants are left to find accom-
modations with friends or relatives, or else live in Red Cross tents.
Permission to rebuild or reopen a sealed house has rarely been given to
the occupants; indeed, the family is seldom permitted to remain on the
land in any capacity.4
However, the Israeli High Court, in July, 1989 restricted the
army's ability to destroy houses arbitrarily, by holding that the resi-
dents have a right to appeal a decision to destroy a house in court
before such an action may take place. The residents of a house sched-
uled for demolition have forty-eight hours to appeal to the local mili-
tary commanders and, if such appeal is denied, have an additional
forty-eight hours to appeal to the High Court. This ruling does not
apply to the army's practice of sealing houses nor any houses de-
stroyed in the case of military operations, such as combat. While this
decision grants the right of appeal to the residents of the condemned
houses, it clearly does not go so far as to prohibit demolitions by the
army in all circumstances.5
The Israelis will generally seal off a portion of a house, rather than
demolish it, if it is likely that the other occupants were unaware of
their fellow occupant's activities. They will also seal off an entire
house if the demolition would likely damage adjoining houses.6 Theo-
retically, actual demolition is reserved for those dwellings occupied by
suspects accused of committing a serious security violation. Israel has
claimed that it avoids demolishing houses of families who were una-
ware of the terrorist's activities. 7
There has been much criticism of the demolitions from a humani-
tarian viewpoint. The loss of a home without compensation is obvi-
ously a devastating blow to the occupants of a demolished building. 8
4. E. PLAYFAIR, DEMOLITION AND SEALING OF HOUSES AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE IN THE
ISRAELI-OCCUPIED WEST BANK 7 (1987).
5. Washington Post, July 31, 1989, at A17.
6. Gazit, The Administered Areas Aspects of Israel's Policy, in ISRAEL INFORMATION MINIS-
TRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS INFORMATION BRIEFING 15-16 (1972).
7. Statement of Moshe Dayan in the Jerusalem Post, Oct. 30, 1968, as cited in J. STONE, No
PEACE-NOWAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (1968).
8. Raja Shehadeh relates the story of one person who had his house destroyed after his son
had been arrested for throwing stones at an army patrol. The homeowner's account of the demo-
lition is as follows:
On 14 November 1982, at 2:00 a.m., a number of Israeli soldiers rushed into our house and
began to search. They did not find anything. They then said that they wanted my son
Waleed who is a 16-year-old school student. They took him with them to the police station
in Jerusalem [known as] the Russian compound. The following night we were surprised to
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Emma Playfair described the situation many dispossessed families
face:
No help is given to the family by the authorities to alleviate their hard-
ship or to provide shelter, other than the minimal assistance available to
all, according to means, from the Social Welfare Department. Unless
neighbours or relatives can take them in, the family is dependent for
shelter on the International Committee of the Red Cross which provides
many such families with tents .... A family which in many cases has
already had a breadwinner detained is also left homeless and often with
inadequate clothing or food. Social and medical problems also arise if
families are divided or have to live in unsuitable or primitive conditions,
or move to an area where they have no local support.9
Playfair also challenges Israel's contention that demolitions are
carried out only in the most extreme cases where an occupant has been
directly linked to a violent act. She cites a case in which two houses
were destroyed in Yatta in 1985 despite the fact that no one was al-
leged to have been injured as the result of the incident which triggered
the demolitions. 10 Fritz Kalshoven argues that the demolitions are
not always in response to a suspect's terrorist activities: "Israeli au-
thorities recently began demolishing homes of Arabs who had been
uncooperative in investigations of terrorism or who had declined to
come forward with information. Previously, demolition was limited to
the homes of those actively engaged in terrorism.""
In Daghlas v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria,12 the
Israeli High Court approvd an order by the Military Commander of
the West Bank to demolish three homes of persons suspected of stab-
bing an Israeli settler. The High Court permitted the houses to be
see a large number of Israeli soldiers enter the house with an army officer. The officer told
me to listen and began reading an order which stated that they wanted to demolish our
house because our son, Waleed, had been accused of throwing stones at an Israel patrol. We
were given 30 minutes to evacuate our house. We were surprised and could not do much in
half an hour as most of the family were still asleep. The soldiers began throwing some of the
furniture out of the house causing a lot if to break. The rest of the furniture remained in the
house. The soldiers placed explosives and blew up the house. So, in a few minutes, my
house... had been destroyed. This quick action did not give us the opportunity to ask for
an injunction at the high Court of Justice ... This house does not belong to my son but is
my property, and now the whole family is in need of a home to live in.
R. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 155-56 (1985). For other
personal accounts relating to demolitions or sealing of houses see IN THEIR OWN WORDS:
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE WEST BANK (World Council of Churches ed. 1983).
9. E. PLAYFAIR, supra note 4, at 7. The International Red Cross has stated: "[G]enerally
Israel does not provide alternative housing or supplies to those affected by demolitions. To do so
would diminish the 'deterrent' effect of the demolition." INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE
RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1976 (1977).
10. E. PLAYFAIR, supra note 4, at 5.
11. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1969 as cited in NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST
DELEGATION, supra note 3, at 66 n. 13.
12. H.C. 698/85 (1986).
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destroyed despite the fact that none of the suspects had been convicted
and one had not even been detained. This case points out the inherent
difficulties in attempting to implement a program which depends upon
immediate retaliation in order to create a deterrence against violence,
yet also claims to reserve such measures for those who actually engage
in violent acts. Given the normally short time between a violent inci-
dent and the retaliatory demolition, it is apparent that the Israelis can
only act upon a suspicion of guilt rather than certainty. The desire for
a quick retaliatory response also leaves little time for investigation,
especially in regard to the knowledge the other occupants of a house
had of the suspected terrorist's activities.
The actual number of houses demolished in the Occupied Territo-
ries cannot be stated with any degree of complete certainty, as there
are many conflicting claims as to the correct figure. Israeli authorities
estimated that 1,224 houses had been destroyed from 1967-81.3 The
Red Cross stated that 1,265 buildings had been destroyed from 1967-
78.14 Al-Haq/Law in the Service of Man has claimed that from 1981
to 1987, 163 houses were demolished, sealed, or partially sealed. 5 It
has been estimated that more than 200 houses have been demolished
since the beginning of the Intifadah.16
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION
Before embarking on a textual analysis of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention, it is necessary to determine whether the terms of the Conven-
tion are applicable to the events in the Occupied Territories. Although
Israel ratified the treaties of the Geneva Convention on April 10, 1951,
it has claimed that the Fourth Convention applies only to occupied
territory which has been seized from a legitimate sovereign. The Is-
raeli Government claims that Jordan and Egypt were not the legiti-
mate sovereigns of the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively since
the armistice agreements following the 1948 War did not recognize
political or territorial boundaries of the land seized during the conflict.
Israeli Supreme Court Justice Meir Shamgar states:
In my opinion there is no existing rule of international law according to
which the Fourth Convention applies in each and every armed conflict
whatever the status of the parties. Territory conquered does not always
13. Jerusalem Post, Nov. 23, 1981, at 1. This figure does not include villages destroyed dur-
ing or immmediately following the 1967 War.
14. INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1978 (1979).
15. For a breakdown of the years 1981-84, see E. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967-82 (1985).
16. Washington Post, supra note 5. Overall, while the use of demolitions decreased dramati-
cally in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the trend has reversed since 1984.
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become occupied territory to which the rules of the Fourth Convention
apply .... The whole idea of the restriction of military government
powers is based on the assumption that there had been a sovereign who
was ousted and that he had been a legitimate sovereign.' 7
Shamgar argues that Jordan's legal standing in the West Bank was
that of a belligerent occupier following an unlawful invasion and not
that of a legitimate sovereign. He points to the fact that only Great
Britain and Pakistan recognized Jordan's annexation of the West Bank
in 1950 as proof of the illegitimacy of Jordan's claim to the West
Bank.' 8 Shamgar maintains that the same conclusion applies to the
Gaza Strip, which was regarded by the Egyptian Government as terri-
tory under military occupation. Thus having established that both
Egypt and Jordan were belligerent occupiers of the territories in ques-
tion, Shamgar concludes that the territorial position is sui generis. It is
therefore claimed that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply
as of right in the territories, but may be applied on a de facto basis.' 9
Unfortunately, Shamgar's argument begs the question concerning
the identity of the rightful sovereign in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
during the years of Jordanian and Egyptian control (1948-67). If a
nation is to be categorized as a belligerent occupier, it must logically
follow that another country has temporarily lost its sovereign control.
Yet what nation possessed such sovereignty before 1948 is not identi-
fied. Shamgar ignores this omission in his thesis, arguing that the situ-
ation is sui generis, which then allows him to justify the inapplicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Although Israel has agreed to abide by the terms of the Fourth
Geneva Convention on a de facto basis, it is necessary to discover
whether Israel is bound by the Convention under the terms of the
17. Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1971 IsR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 263. In a similar vein, Yehuda Zvi Blum has written:
Tihe traditional rules of international law governing belligerent occupation are based on a'
two-fold assumption, namely, (a) that it was the legitimate sovereign which was ousted from
the territory under occupation; and (b) that the ousting side qualifies as a belligerent occu-
pant with respect to the territory. According to Glahn, "belligerent occupation ... as
regulated by customary and conventional international law, presupposes a state of affairs in
which the sovereign, the legitimate government of the occupied territory, is at war with the
government of the occupying forces." This assumption of the concurrent existence in re-
spect of the same territory of both an ousted legitimate sovereign and a belligerent occupant
lies at the root of all those rules of international law, which, while recognizing and sanction-
ing the occupant's rights to administer the occupied territory, aim at the same time to safe-
guard the reversionary rights of the ousted sovereign. It would seem to follow that, in a case
like the present where the ousted State never was the legitimate sovereign, those rules of
belligerent occupation directed to safeguarding the sovereign's reversionary rights have no
application.
Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 IsR. L. REv.
279, 293 (1968).
18. Shamgar, supra note 17, at 264-65.
19. Id. at 266.
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treaty, or if its implementation is discretionary. Article 2 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention states in part, "The Convention shall also
apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance."' 20 Egypt, Jordan and Israel acceded to the terms of
the Fourth Geneva Convention prior to the outbreak of hostilities in
1967.21 Thus, it facially appears that the Fourth Geneva Convention
would apply since all three interested parties have controlled either the
West Bank or Gaza Strip, and have ratified the Convention.
However, Israel concentrates on the status of the territory in-
volved, i.e., that article 2 refers only to land taken from a sovereign
High Contracting Party. The Israeli position, if accepted, would effec-
tively negate the applicability of the Convention to any conflict involv-
ing territory whose sovereign status was in question. Adoption of the
Israeli argument would violate the intended purpose of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention - the protection of civilians in time of war. As an
example of the drafters' intent to allow for the liberal application of
the Convention, article 2 states that the Fourth Geneva Convention
applies even if a state of war is not recognized by one of the Con-
tracting Parties. Similarly, during the drafting of the Fourth Conven-
tion, the Special Committee charged with formulating acceptable
compromise language for article 2 concluded that, in regard to a war
between a Contracting Party and an adverse state not a party to the
Convention, the Contracting Party should still try to apply the articles
of the Convention. Their report stated that "according to the spirit of
the four Conventions, the Contracting States shall apply them, in so
far as possible, as being the codification of rules which are generally
recognized. 22
The applicability of the Fourth Convention to the Occupied Terri-
tories has been supported by the International Committee of the Red
Cross,23 the United Nations General Assembly, 24 the United Nations
20. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, at art. 2. Article 2 reads in full:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Con-
vention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict whch may arise
between two or more high Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by
one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a high Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They
shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter
accepts and applies the provision thereof.
21. Jordan ratified the Convention on May 29, 1951 (91 U.N.T.S. 381); Israel on July 6, 1951
(96 U.N.T.S. 326); and Egypt on November 10, 1952 (150 U.N.T.S. 372).
22. 2B DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, FINAL RECORD 108 (1949).
23. The ICRC, on May 24, 1968, notified the Government of Israel that in its opinion the
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Security Council, 25 and by the United States.26 The Israeli position
has also been criticized in some academic circles as well.27  From a
practical viewpoint, acceptance of the Israeli claim would seriously
weaken the force of the Fourth Geneva Convention because it would
allow nations to make fine legal arguments in order to evade and frus-
trate the purpose and spirit of the Convention. The humanitarian
protections provided by the drafters of the Fourth Convention cannot
be allowed to be negated by a legal dispute involving the sovereign
Fourth Convention applied to the Occupied Territories. In its reply on June 16, 1968, the Israeli
Government stated that it wished to leave open the question of whether the Fourth Convention
actually applied. 106 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CRoss 427 (1970). See also id., at 487-88, in
which the ICRC detailed its efforts to convince the Israeli Government that the destruction of
houses in the Occupied Territories was a clear violation of articles 33 and 53. The ICRC stressed
that the demolitions which had taken place constituted collective reprisals, in violation of article
33. The Red Cross recently reaffirmed its position in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS ANNUAL REPORT 1987 (1988), at 83-84, in which it stated that it considered "the condi-
tions for application of the Fourth Geneva Convention are fulfilled in all of the occupied territo-
ries... whatever status the Israeli authorities ascribe to those territories."
24. See G.A. Res. 2443, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968),
which called upon "the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes
of the Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel and to respect and implement
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in
occupied territories." See also G.A. Res. 2252, ES-V U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3-4, U.N.
Doc. A/6798 (1967); and G.A. Res. 3092, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 28-30, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974). There are numerous other General Assembly Resolutions which call for the
mandatory implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories.
Similarly, the Report of the Special Working Group of Experts Established under Resolution 6
(XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights, 26 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1016/Add. 1,
at 5 (1970), stated:
Whereas the Government of Israel has stated that the applicability of the Convention should
be left open, the Group wishes that the Occupying Power would now commence to apply
the Convention .... The Occupying Power should refrain from demolishing houses for
reasons which are not provided for in the Geneva Convention.
25. Four days after the 1967 War ended, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 237
which recommended "to the governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian
principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and protection of civilian persons in time
of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949." 22 U.N. SCOR (1361st mtg.)
at 5 (1967).
26. On July 1, 1969, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles Yost,
stated in the U.N. Security Council that the Government of Israel was required to apply the
Fourth Geneva Convention. He added that the U.S. Government had "so informed the Govern-
ment of Israel on numerous occasions since June, 1967." 61 U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE BULL. 76, 77
(1969). The United States also joined a United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolu-
tion which condemned the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention (Feb. 4, 1978).
27. See e.g., The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1977) (testimony of Prof. W.T. Mallison). Mallison states:
Even if the claim that Jordan annexed the West Bank unlawfully should be accepted for
purposes of legal argument, this does not mean that this territory is not "the territory of a
high contracting party' within the meaning of Article 2. It is well established that the word
'territory' includes, in addition to de jure title, a mere de facto title to the territory. Other-
wise, civilians in disputed territory would be denied the protection of law ....
Other relevant academic criticism includes F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 316-17
(1971); NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION, supra note 3, at xiv-xvi.
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status of the Occupied Territories. Arguments over the legal sover-
eignty of contested territory cannot eradicate the requirement that
Contracting Parties have to follow the provisions of the Fourth Con-
vention; otherwise, the Convention would become a meaningless shell
of protection for civilians in time of war.
III. APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
The Palestinians living the Occupied Territories are covered by the
Fourth Geneva Convention under article 47. Article 47 states:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in
any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present
Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of
a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor
by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied ter-
ritories with the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter
of the whole or part of the occupied territory.
When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gained control of the Occu-
pied Territories in 1967, the Proclamation of the Assumption of Gov-
ernment by the Israel Defense Forces (Proclamation No. 2) was
published. This provision directed in part:
2. The law in existence in the Region on 7 June 1967 shall remain in
force insofar as it does not in any way conflict with the provisions of this
Proclamation or any Proclamation or Order which may be issued by me,
and subject to modifications resulting from the establishment of govern-
ment by the Israel Defense Forces in the Region. 28
Thus, the law which existed in the Occupied Territories prior to the
IDF's entrance was, with few exceptions, to be enforced by the Israe-
lis. In the West Bank this meant that any residual law of the Otto-
man, British and Jordanian entities was to be enforced, while in the
Gaza Strip laws established by the Egyptian military were continued
to be enforced in addition to the Ottoman and British acts which
remained.
A. Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119
A British regulation, enacted in 1945, has been relied upon by the
Israelis as a legal justification for the practice of demolishing or sealing
houses in the Occupied Territories. The Palestine Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulation 119 (hereinafter DER 119) passed pursuant to the
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1945 (British Imperial Statute)29
states:
28. Territories Administered by Israel Military Proclamations, Orders and Judicial Decisions:
Extracts (Shapiro-Libai ed.), 1971 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 419.
29. Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, ch. 31.
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119.(1) A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the
Government of Palestine of any house, structure or land from which he
has reason to suspect that any firearm has been illegally discharged, or
any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendiary article illegally thrown, or
any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter
or street the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satis-
fied have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the commission
of, or been accessories after the fact to the commission of, any offence
against these Regulations involving violence or intimidation or any Mili-
tary Court offence; and when any house, structure or land is forfeited as
aforesaid, the Military Commander may destroy the house or the struc-
ture of anything growing on the land.
DER 119 is of utmost importance since it provides the legal under-
pinning for the demolitions. It is also important to note that DER 119
gives the Military Commander wide latitude in employing this mea-
sure. The regulation allows the Military Commander to order the for-
feiture of a house or land whenever he "has reason to suspect" that a
house has been used as a base from which an attack originated or if a
suspect lived in the dwelling. The regulation does not require that a
formal legal hearing take place before such action may occur.
The Israelis contend that despite the occupation of the West Bank
by the Jordanians, and the Gaza Strip by the Egyptians subsequent to
the 1948 War, DER 119 was never explicitly repealed by either coun-
try and thus the regulation was still in effect in 1967. However, this
position has been challenged by both the Jordanians and the
Palestinians.
The Jordanians and the Palestinians claim that the British regula-
tion was abolished by the Jordanian Government when the Jordanian
Defence Regulations of 1935 came into effect in the West Bank on
May 14, 1948.30 The Jordanian Government had stipulated that the
regulations would apply in any country or territory in which the
Jordanian Army was stationed. On May 24, 1948, General Hashem,
the Military Commander of the West Bank, issued Proclamation No.
2 which stated that all of the laws and regulations in effect in Palestine
at the end of the Mandate would remain in force save where they con-
flicted with the Jordanian Defence Regulations of 1935. 31
The Israelis counter that the Jordanian Law of Modification of
Administrative Procedures in Palestine, which came into effect on De-
cember 1, 1949, stated that "all laws, Regulations and Orders in force
30. For a more complete discussion of the Jordanian and Israeli positions on the applicability
of the British regulations, see Shefi, The Protection of Human Rights in Areas Administered by
Israel: United Nations Findings and Reality, 1973 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337, 342-45; E. COHEN,
supra note 15 at 94-95.
31. Shefi, supra note 30, at 344.
1203
Michigan Journal of International Law
at the end of the Mandate over Palestine shall remain in effect until
abolished or modified." In addition, the Law Concerning the Laws
and Regulations Prevailing in Both Banks of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan (Sept. 16, 1950) provided that the laws and regulations pre-
vailing in each of the two Banks would remain in place until such time
as the National Council and His Royal Highness issued a united code
for both Banks. Thus, it is argued that the language of these two
Jordanian acts makes clear that the British regulations were never for-
mally repealed by Jordan and were therefore still enforceable during
Jordan's occupancy of the West Bank.32
It has also been argued that the Jordanian Arms and Ammunition
Law and the Explosives Law, which declared that they abolished "any
other Jordanian or Palestinian legislation which was in effect before
this law, insofar as that legislation contradicts the provisions of this
law," effectively repealed the British Regulations in question. 33 The
Israelis contend that the language of DER 119 did not explicitly con-
ffict with the two acts and thus was not abolished when those laws
went into effect.
Finally, it has recently been contended that the British Govern-
ment revoked the Regulations before the end of their Mandatory con-
trol over Palestine. In 1987 the British Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs wrote, "I confirm that, in view of the Pal-
estine (Revocation) Order in Council 1948, the Palestine (Defence)
Order in Council 1937 and the Defence Regulations 1945 made under
it are, as a matter of English law, no longer in force."'34
Despite the recent British disclaimer as to the continuing validity
of the Regulations, the Regulations were in fact employed by the
Jordanians from 1948-1967.35 Jordan used the Regulations against
the populace in the West Bank which had rebelled against the monar-
chy. 36 Since Jordan never explicitly abolished the Regulations, and
indeed used them to counter uprisings on the West Bank, it is appar-
32. Israel's High Court in H.C. 97/79, Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria
Region, 33 (3) Piskei Din 309, ruled that the regulations had never been implicitly or explicitly
abolished and therefore remain in force as enacted in 1945.
33. See Shefi, supra note 30, at 345.
34. E. PLAYFAIR, supra note 4, at 33 n.9.
35. Julius Stone contends that DER 119 was continued in the State of Israel and in the West
Bank by Jordan concurrently by the Law for the General Administration of Palestine, No. 17 of
1949, Section 2, Off. Gaz. No. 1002, at 380, and by the Royal Law No. 28 of 1950, along with the
General Defence Regulations No. 2 of 1939, under the Transjordan Defence Ordinance of 1935.
Stone, Behind the Cease-Fire Lines: Israel's Administration in Gaza and the West Bank, in OF
LAW AND MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HAIM H. COHN 79, 107 n.35 (S. Shoham ed. 1971).
36. See Kuttner, Israel and the West Bank- Aspects of the Law of Belligerent Occupation,
1977 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 166, 224-25; E. COHEN, supra note 15, at 96.
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ent that DER 119 was still valid on the West Bank when the Israelis
began their occupation in 1967. The British Mandatory law was also
enforced by the Egyptians in the Gaza Strip.37
B. Article 64: Continuation of the Local Law
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 21 provides the legal
mechanism through which DER 119 is implemented. The article
states:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the
exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying
Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obsta-
cle to the application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter
consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administra-
tion of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to
function in respect to all offences covered by the said laws.38
Israel recognized the principle behind article 64 when it issued
Proclamation No. 2, which formally announced that any law which
had existed prior to June 7, 1967, would continue to be enforced with
few exceptions. Supporters of Israel's use of DER 119 argue that
under article 64 all such laws must be enforced unless they pose a
threat to the Occupying Power's military security or in some way con-
tradict the provisions of the Convention. Julius Stone has written:
[T]he demolitions in question have taken place under provisions of local
penal law in force when Israel entered into occupation. Article 64 thus
seems even to require continuance of this law. Moreover the same para-
graph permits repeal of such a law in force which is a threat to the occu-
pant's security. It would thus be very strange indeed to hold that the
occupant was forbidden to maintain the existing law when this was nec-
essary for his security. The paragraph also authorizes him to repeal a
law which obstructs the application of the Convention; but it does not
oblige him to do SO. 3 9
Critics of Israel's enforcement of DER 119 argue that the regula-
tion violates the provision of article 64 which requires an Occupying
Power to repeal existing laws which represent "an obstacle to the ap-
plication of the present Convention." 4° It is argued that enforcement
37. Holtzman, Security Legislation in the Occupied Areas, in 4 ARAB AND AFo-AsmN
MONOGRAPH SERIEs 78 (1968).
38. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, at art. 64. Article 64 originally derived from Arti-
cle 43 of the Hague Regulations. Article 43 provides that the occupant "shall take all the meas-
ures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force of the country." The Hague Regula-
tions are officially known as the Annex to the International Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
39. Stone, supra note 35, at 97 (emphasis in original).
40. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, at art. 64.
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of DER 119 violates the spirit of the Fourth Geneva Convention
which was intended to provide protection for civilians in time of war.
Stone counters by noting that while article 64 permits the abolition of
local penal law which is contrary to the Convention's principles, it
does not oblige the Occupying Power to do S0.41
Stone's argument runs counter to the Commentary, IV Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War ("Commentary: Geneva Convention IV"), which declares that the
provision which states that local laws may be rescinded if they are
contrary to the principles of the Convention:
[I]s in the interests of the population and makes it possible to abrogate
any discriminatory measures incompatible with humane requirements.
It refers, in particular, to provisions which adversely affect racial or reli-
gious minorities, such provisions being contrary to the spirit of the Con-
vention (Article 27), which forbids all adverse distinction based, in
particular, on race, religion or political opinion.
This means that when the penal legislation of the occupied territory
conflicts with the provisions of the Convention, the Convention must
prevail.42
In addition, looking to the drafters' intent during the formulation
of the Convention, one may find further evidence of the principle that
local law is not to be enforced if it contravenes the spirit of the Con-
vention. The U.S. representative during the drafting of the Geneva
Convention, Mr. Ginnane, asserted that the Occupying Power should
in no way use the criminal law of the Occupied Power as an instru-
ment of oppression. He referred to the fact that the Americans, after
World War II, found it necessary as an Occupying Power to abrogate
the laws established by the Nazis in Germany. 43 The Drafting Com-
mittee later adopted an amendment offered by the United Kingdom
which included a provision which allowed the Occupying Power to
disregard the penal laws of the occupied territory if they contravened
the principles of the Convention. The Soviet Union's amendment,
which did not include such a provision, was defeated. 44
C. DER 119's Conflict with the Convention
It thus becomes apparent that the efficacy of Israel's justification
for the demolitions based on DER 119's incorporation through article
41. J. STONE, supra note 7, at 15 (1969).
42. J. PICTET, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 335-36 (R. Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans. 1958)
(emphasis added).
43. 2A DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, FINAL RECORD 670 (1949).
44. Id. at 771.
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64 depends on whether the regulation conflicts with the Convention as
a whole. It is therefore necessary to examine the various articles of the
Convention to determine whether any of them preclude the demolition
of houses as a deterrent measure.
D. Article 53: Destruction of Property
Article 53 pertains to the destruction of property by an Occupying
Power. The article declares:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State,
or to other public authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations,
is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely nec-
essary by military operations.
The legality of the demolitions quite obviously depends upon how
article 53 is construed. The primary definitional problem which arises
in article 53 analysis rests with how the phrase "absolutely necessary
by military operations" 45 is interpreted. The Israelis demolish houses
in order to deter the population from engaging in hostile activities,
contending that deterring terrorism constitutes an action of utmost
military necessity. General Shlomo Gazit, Military Administrator of
the Occupied Territories, stated:
The effectiveness of the blowing-up of houses lies in the fact that it is an
immediate punishment and if we want to deter somebody, we cannot
stop and wait for the normal legal machinery .... If we want to deter
terrorists the effects must be seen immediately by the population.46
Gazit maintains that "[s]trict adherence to the principle of demol-
ishing or sealing off every house or apartment from which a terrorist
act has been launched has proved to be effectively deterrent. ' 47 Gazit
does admit that the Israelis at times improperly destroy property due
to the exigent nature of the demolition policy. He explains that the
demolition process is an "arbitrary act without the possibilities of in-
vestigating thoroughly... [W]e are not angels. Here and there a mis-
take is possible."'48
Meir Shamgar explained what he believed constituted an absolute
military necessity:
Military requirement can be of two kinds: on the one hand, there is the
45. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, at art. 53.
46. NATIONAL LAWYER'S GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION, supra note 3, at 64 n.8.
47. Gazit, supra note 6, at 16.
48. Israel's Occupation Policies, NEW OUTLOOK, July-Aug. 1968, at 47, 49. Gazit went on to
say, "The act of blowing up houses is essentially also a deterrent action, a punishment which is
supposed to deter others. I am not sure that expropriation would achieve the same deterrent
effect." Id. at 49-50.
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necessity to destroy the physical base for military action when persons in
the commission of a hostile military act are discovered. The house from
which hand grenades are thrown is a military base, not different from a
bunker in other parts of the world. On the other hand, there is the ne-
cessity to create effective military reaction. The measure under discus-
sion is of utmost deterrent importance, especially in a country where
capital punishment is not used.49
An Israeli Ministry of Defence publication pointed to the deter-
rence effect of demolishing houses of terrorists:
The blowing up of houses owned or used by terrorists, in accordance
with the law obtaining in Judea, Samaria and Gaza - as well as in Israel
- has.., proved an effective deterrent and a humane method.. .There
is no doubt that by blowing up a few dozen houses of proven terrorists,
bent on indiscriminate murder... thousands of innocent lives.., have
been saved. 50
An Israeli military officer identified the main reason for a quick re-
sponse to terrorist activity when he said, "We do not want someone
who is thinking of putting a bomb in a supermarket to wait six or nine
months until he sees what happens to someone else." 5 1 In an article
appearing in Cardozo Law Review which supported the practice of
demolitions on deterrence grounds, Reicin stated:
[D]estruction of homes may deter those persons actually contemplating
terrorist acts as well as those who might otherwise harbor terrorists or
encourage such acts. The act of destroying houses serves as a dramatic
warning to those contemplating similar actions. Even individuals who
may be willing to undertake suicide missions and would not be deterred
by most other types of punishment, might reconsider in light of the vis-
ual reality of destruction as well as the awareness that financial disaster
could befall their families or landlord. Moreover, the destruction may
cause family members to make concerted efforts to discourage their chil-
dren or siblings from committing acts of violence; landlords may also
interfere by evicting those suspected of terrorist involvement. Finally,
internal policing by the community may also become more active.5 2
Professor Alan Dershowitz takes a different tact in justifying the
demolitions. Dershowitz argues that the destruction of property is a
far less onerous punishment for a suspected terrorist than imprisoning
or executing him. Dershowitz states:
Let us assume that such destruction would be a technical violation of
49. Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1971 ISR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 275.
50. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION IN JUDEA, SAMARIA,
AND GAZA - A RECORD OF PROGRESS 7 (1968).
51. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1969.
52. Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews, Demolition of House, and Deportations: An Analy-
sis of Measures Employed by Israel in the Administered Territories, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 515, 547
(1987).
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some Convention. On the other hand, looked at realistically, what is it?
It is a monetary punishment. Surely everybody would agree that, in
terms of human values, it is better to destroy somebody's house than to
destroy somebody's person, it is better to destroy his house than to de-
tain him .... Any objective person, looking at the two situations, would
have to conclude that detention is a much more serious violation than
economic punishment - specifically, the destroying of houses ....
So in one sense one could argue, and I thus argue, that what Israel
did in destroying the houses, is, at worst, foolish because it conjures up
the image of collective responsibility and because it feeds on the kind
of middle-class values which put property over human conditions. But
surely it is very difficult to find any moral basis for making a compara-
tive condemnation of Israel's destruction of houses ... vis-a-vis another
government's detention of the same people under the same
circumstances. 3
Dershowitz's argument attempts to place the demolitions into the
broader context of possible deterrent measures the Israelis could con-
ceivably implement. By comparing the demolitions with detentions or
capital punishment, Dershowitz emphasizes the relative leniency, in
human terms, of the Israeli policy of destroying houses. His analysis,
however logical it may appear, misses the crux of the issue. Dersho-
witz's fundamental assumption that the Israeli practice of demolition
is preferable to detention ignores the fact that, in reality, the Israelis
usually detain Palestinians suspected of terrorist activities in addition
to demolishing their place of residence. Thus, any justification for the
practice of demolition as a deterrence measure cannot be based on an
argument which alleges that the demolitions are a lesser evil than de-
tention since the Israelis often do both. Dershowitz's position also
lacks sound legal reasoning. Following his approach, legal analysis
would turn on a subjective determination of what is least intrusive
rather than on textual analysis of the applicable international law.
The Israelis point to Pictet's Commentary: Geneva Convention IV
for support for their position that the deterrence effect of the demoli-
tions meets the requisite criteria for being "absolutely necessary" in
military terms. The Commentary: Geneva Convention IV declares
that "[i]t will be for the Occupying Power to judge the importance of
such military operations.154 Israel maintains that its eradication of
terrorist bases is well within the permissible scope envisioned by the
drafters of article 53. It is argued that the destruction of terrorist ba-
ses is a fundamental tenet of counter-guerrilla strategy and therefore
such action should be classified as being of imperative military neces-
53. Symposium on Human Rights, 1971 IsR. Y.B. HUM. Ris. 361, 376-77.
54. J. PicrET, supra note 42, at 302.
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sity under article 53.55
The Israeli High Court of Justice has consistently upheld the legal-
ity of demolishing suspected terrorists' homes.56 In Hamri v. Regional
Commander of Judea and Samaria, the Court held that under DER
119 it was permissible to (1) expropriate the house, (2) seal part of the
house, (3) seal off the entire house or (4) demolish the entire house.57
Since the homeowner's son had allegedly killed an Israeli, it was held
that the destruction of the house was warranted. The Court also noted
that the demolition of the house would have a strong deterrent effect
upon others contemplating such actions.58 The Court did, however,
state that demolitions should be used sparingly due to the devastating
effects such an action has upon other residents of the house who may
not have been involved in the terrorist activity.5 9
In Motzlah v. Minister of Defense, 60 the Court upheld a demolition
order which was issued in retaliation for a bombing that had occurred
two years earlier. The Court held that despite the passage of time
between the incident in question and the demolition order, there had
been no abuse of discretion.
There is a strong legal argument against the Israeli interpretation
of article 53. The disagreement centers on when a demolition can
truly be rendered "absolutely necessary by military operations."'61
The question arises whether deterrence alone satisfies the standard ar-
ticulated in article 53. The International Committee of the Red Cross
believes it does not. The Director of the Department of Principles and
Law at the ICRC defined what constituted an absolute military
operation:
In the opinion of the ICRC, the expression 'military operations' must
be construed to mean the movements, manoeuvres, and other action
taken by the armed forces with a view to fighting. Destruction of prop-
erty as mentioned in article 53 cannot be justified under the terms of that
55. Reicin, supra note 52, at 546.
56. See e.g., Sakhwil v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, H.C. 434/79, 34(1) P.D.
464 (1980) (Court ruled DER 119 was valid under Geneva Convention IV and permitted sealing
off of suspected terrorist's room); Khamed v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, H.C.
22/81, 35(3) P.D. 223 (1981) (property may be seized for punitive measures if occupant has
committed a major security offense); Hamamra v. Minister of Defense, H.C. 274/82, 36(2) P.D.
755 (1982) (Court allowed complete sealing of house despite fact that the entire family would be
homeless due to sixteen-year-old son's planting of bomb); Abu Allan v. Minister of Defense, H.C.
126/81, 37(2) P.D. 169 (1983) (sealing of room permissible reaction to occupant's stone
throwing).
57. H.C. 361/82, 36(3) P.D. 439, 441, 442 (1982).
58. Id. at 442.
59. Id.
60. H.C. 572/82, 36(4) P.D. 610 (1982).
61. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, at art. 53.
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article unless such destruction is absolutely necessary - i.e., materially
indispensable - for the armed forces to engage in action, such as mak-
ing way for them.
This exception to the prohibition cannot justify destruction as a pun-
ishment or deterrent, since to preclude this type of destruction is an es-
sential aim of the article.
The authors of the Commentary on the Fourth Convention were in
full agreement with the ICRC on this, as confirmed by Mr. Jean Pictet,
under whose direction the Commentary was published. 62
Since the Israelis justify the demolitions for deterrence reasons, it can-
not be claimed that the demolitions have taken place in the midst of
conflict or are of immediate military necessity. Esther Cohen agrees
that the Israelis have not always acted in accordance with the literal
language of article 53 as she notes: "The necessity was not, however,
imperative, the demolition was not done in the heat of the battle but
mostly after the saboteur or armaments were found in the apartment
or house.".63 Draper also believes that the demolitions cannot be justi-
fied as a military necessity:
It would appear that after the guerrilla has used the house from which
he committed hostile acts, the blowing up takes place in circumstances
wholly unrelated to military operations which may not even be in pro-
gress at the time .... To appeal to the humanitarian element by stating,
which is true, that the inhabitants are first removed before blowing up
the house, destroys the very basis of his argument for the application of
article 53 under its exceptive clause. 64
Yoran Dinstein has also argued that the demolitions violate article 53:
"[I]n view of the provision of article 53, it is forbidden.., to demolish
an [sic] house belonging to a protected person in an occupied territory
merely because the owner or tenant is suspected of rendering assist-
ance to saboteurs. '65 Kalshoven states that the demolitions are pro-
hibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention. He writes: "[I]t needs no
argument that in the instances discussed here, i.e., in regard to the
occupied territories there was no question of military operations, let
alone that these could have made the demolitions absolutely
necessary.' 66
The United Nations' Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Territories cited numerous examples of houses and entire villages de-
62. From a letter by Jacques Moreillon (Nov. 25, 1961) (emphasis in original).
63. E. COHEN, supra note 15, at 101.
64. Draper, Military Necessity and Humanitarian Imperatives, 12 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL
MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE, 140-41 (1973).
65. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights, 8 1978
IsR. Y.B. HUM. Rrs. 104, 128.
66. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 27, at 320.
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stroyed by Israeli authorities in the Occupied Territories.67 It de-
clared that the Government of Israel's policy to destroy the houses of
persons suspected of helping members of the resistance was in viola-
tion of articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 68
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2851 (XXXVI) (1971), com-
mended the Special Committee's report and "[s]trongly call[ed] upon
Israel to rescind forthwith all measures and to desist from all policies
and practices as . . . [t]he destruction and demolition of villages,
quarters and houses."
In the face of much criticism of its demolition policy, Israel has
maintained that such action is permissible as a deterrent to terrorist
activity. In part, the Israelis rely on the Commentary: Geneva Con-
vention IV which states that it is up to the Occupying Power to judge
the importance of the military operation used to justify the destruction
of property. However, this provision is not without a limiting qualifi-
cation. The Commentary: Geneva Convention IV also stated that the
Occupying Power's discretion in this area is not absolute:
It is therefore to be feared that bad faith in the application of the reserva-
tion may render the proposed safeguard valueless; for unscrupulous re-
course to the clause concerning military necessity would allow the
Occupying Power to circumvent the prohibition set forth in the Conven-
tion. The Occupying Power must therefore try to interpret the clause in
a reasonable manner. Whenever it is felt essential to resort to destruc-
tion, the occupying authorities must try to keep a sense of proportion in
comparing military advantages to be gained with the damage done.69
The language contained in the Commentary: Geneva Convention
IV states that without some limitation on the permissible scope of de-
struction of property that can be carried out by an Occupying Power,
the exception would swallow the rule. The use of demolitions as a
deterrence measure is problematic, because deterrence as a logical con-
struct is not the equivalent to destroying a building in the heat of bat-
tle. Allowing an Occupying Power to justify demolition of houses on
the basis that such action is needed to control the population would
greatly expand the scope of the exception beyond what is acceptable if
article 53 is to retain its vitality. There is a vast difference between
destroying a house which contains a sniper and demolishing a building
67. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, U.N. Doc. A/8389 (1971), at 44-46.
68. Id. at 54. It should be noted that the Special Committee was made up of three persons
from nations which did not have diplomatic relations with Israel (Ceylon, Somalia, and Yugosla-
via). The spokesman of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations called the Special
Committee "a willing tool of the Arab propaganda machine." 3 THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT
929 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974).
69. J. PICTET, supra note 42, at 302.
1212 [Vol. 11:1195
Summer 1990] Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses
because a suspected terrorist lived in the house. The major difficulty
-with the adoption of the Israeli position is that it would blur what is
permissible under the clause 'absolute military operations' to the ex-
tent that the provision is robbed of its literal meaning and becomes a
subjective determination left to the unfettered discretion of the Occu-
pying Power.
Article 53 would become a hollow shell of protection for the civil-
ian population of occupied territories if the Occupying Power is given
complete discretion in interpreting the exception clause. Destruction
under the provision 'absolute military operations' must be limited to
situations in which an Occupying Power is confronted with an armed
attack from a building. Such an interpretation would prevent the Oc-
cupying Power from abusing the exception clause and thereby negat-
ing the spirit of article 53. Allowing deterrence to be used as a
justification for demolishing houses would rob article 53 of its vitality
since the standard used to determine the legality of such action would
be ambiguous due to the lack of a bright-line rule.
E. Article 33: Prohibition of Collective Punishment
Another troublesome accusation which has been levelled at the
practice of demolitions in the Occupied Territories is that the act often
destroys or impairs the dwellings of many people who were not actu-
ally involved in terrorist activities. Quite often, when a house is de-
stroyed, entire families lose their homes due to the suspected actions' of
one member of the family or a tenant. Article 33 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention provides a clear prohibition against any form of col-
lective punishment:
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of
intimidation of terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals
against protected persons and their property are prohibited. 70
If persons who are not involved in terrorist activities are deprived of
their homes as the result of a demolition, such an action would be
classified as an illegal form of collective punishment under article 33.
The Israelis contend that houses are demolished only if all of the
members of the residence are in some way implicated or were aware of
the violent act committed by another resident. Shefi states that
"[d]emolition is never carried out as a collective punishment, but only
70. Article 33 is derived from article 50 of the Hague Regulations which states, "[N]o gen-
eral penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts
of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly or severally responsible." Annex to
the International Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 38,
art. 50.
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and solely as a punishment of the individual involved." 71  Shefi also
argues that "[n]o such action is taken unless . . .there [is] a direct
connection between the building and terrorist and other violent activi-
ties.' ' 72 Moshe Dayan stated in the Knesset that Israel's policy is not
to destroy houses unless the family or resident were aware of the ter-
rorist's activities. 73 These contentions do not square with Israel's
stated policy of using the demolitions as a deterrence measure. There
is generally not a thorough investigation of the complicity or involve-
ment of the suspected terrorist's fellow residents before the house is
demolished or sealed. The reality of the situation in the Occupied Ter-
ritories is that the demolitions take place soon after a violent act
occurs.
The procedural nature of the demolitions before the recent
Supreme Court decision confirms this fact. The occupants of the
house to be demolished were given no right of appeal. 74 Moshe Dayan
admitted this fact in the Knesset on February 13, 1968, when he stated
that although the owners and tenants are informed about the impend-
ing demolition, they are not given an opportunity to appeal the demo-
lition order. 75 As Gazit said, "[I]f we want to deter somebody, we
cannot stop and wait for the normal, legal machinery."' 76 The imme-
diate retaliatory nature of the demolitions in effect negated the argu-
ment that all of the members of a house must be implicated in terrorist
activities before their house was destroyed. It is practically impossible
in most cases to ascertain the complicity of each of the residents in the
short time between the occurrence of the violent act and the demoli-
tion order. It remains to be seen whether the residents' new right of
appeal will prevent the army from demolishing the houses of persons
who are not implicated in the act giving rise to the demolition order.
Kalshoven rejects the Israeli contention that the demolitions are
intended as a punitive measure against those actually involved in sub-
versive activities: "Any attempt to justify the destructions as a puni-
tive measure inflicted on individual suspects is bound to fail, in view of
the conspicuous absence of anything like a fair and regular trial pre-
71. Shefi, supra note 30, at 346.
72. Shefi, The Reports of the UN Special Committees on Israeli Practices in the Territories, in
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-80: THE
LEGAL ASPECTS 285, 301 (M. Shamgar ed. 1982).
73. Jerusalem Post, Oct. 30, 1968, as cited in J. STONE, supra note 7, at 15.
74. While there is no general right to appeal the demolition order, the owner may file an
appeal to the Claims Appeals Board for compensation. However, this tactic rarely succeeds as
the Board recognizes the military commander's order as primary legislation and does not rely on
international law as its primary source of law. E. COHEN, supra note 15, at 102.
75. 51 Divrei Haknesset 1026.
76. Gazit, supra note 6, at 5.
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ceding the execution of the measures and establish the liability to pun-
ishment of the persons in question. '77 In Daghlas v. The Military
Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, the Israeli High Court
conceded that the demolitions are primarily designed to make a poten-
tial terrorist think twice about committing a violent act due to the
repercussions it would have upon his family. The Court stated that a
suspect "should know that his criminal acts will not only hurt him,
but are apt to cause great suffering to his family."' 7 This statement is
an indication of the intended effect of Israel's demolition policy - it is
designed to inhibit violent activities by punishing both the suspect and
his family. The effectiveness of such a policy cannot be denied; it is
safe to assume that this approach has acted as a powerful deterrent to
those wishing to act against the Israelis.
Article 33 clearly prohibits the punishment of innocent people for
the acts of others. During the drafting of article 33, the Italian repre-
sentative stated that the new article was an improvement from article
50 of the Hague Regulations, which did not exclude the possibility of
collective sanctions for individual acts which might be attributed to
the population as a whole.79 The Commentary: Geneva Convention
IV notes that it is no longer feasible to justify collective punishment on
the grounds that "the community might bear at least a passive respon-
sibility" for an act committed against an Occupying Power.80 It sum-
marized the legal principle which was established by article 33 as
follows:
This provision is very clear .... Responsibility is personal and it will
no longer be possible to inflict penalties on persons who have not com-
mitted the acts complained of ....
The prohibition of reprisals is a safeguard for all protected persons,
whether in the territory of a Party to the conflict or in occupied territory.
It is absolute and mandatory in character and thus cannot be interpreted
as containing a tacit reservations with regard to military necessity.
The solemn and unconditional character of the undertaking entered
into by the State Parties to the Convention must be emphasized. To
infringe this provision with the idea of restoring law and order would
only add one more violation to those with which the enemy is
reproaching.81
It is clear that the Israeli practice of demolishing the houses of
suspected terrorists immediately after a violent act occurs is a viola-
77. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 27, at 321.
78. H.C.J. 698/85.
79. 2B DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, FINAL RECORD 648 (1949).
80. J. PicTET, supra note 42, at 225.
81. Id. at 225, 228.
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tion of article 33 if the other residents of the home have no proven
knowledge or involvement with the suspect's activities. Since collec-
tive punishment is prohibited by article 33, the Israelis may justify a
demolition only if they can prove individual complicity by each of the
persons living in the condemned building. This requirement would
however defeat the Israelis' objective of striking back immediately af-
ter a violent act has occurred, for the determination of individual re-
sponsibility by the residents would necessitate a thorough
investigation and trial.
Despite the fact that DER 119 does not specifically require knowl-
edge by the inhabitants of the terrorist's activities, it is impermissible
to rely on local law to implement a policy of collective punishment.
Gerhard von Glahn states: "[I]nvocation of domestic law or of do-
mestic custom on the part of the belligerent occupant could not affect
the essential illegality of the alleged reprisal: such law and such cus-
tom could not take effect in territory under belligerent occupation in
view of the Fourth Geneva Convention and provisions. ' 82 The right
of appeal granted to the residents of the Occupied Territories may
serve to eliminate the violations of article 33 previously committed by
the Israeli army by restricting the demolitions to the homes of people
actually proven to have engaged in violent activities. It remains to be
seen whether the appeal process will necessitate a thorough investiga-
tion and trial or will simply be a rubber stamp for the army's request
for demolitions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Demolitions and the sealing of houses in the Occupied Territories
often run afoul of article 53's restriction of such destruction to in-
stances involving an imperative military operation, as well as article
33's prohibition of collective punishment. Although there may be oc-
currences in which such action may satisfy the requirements of both
articles, there can be little doubt that in the majority of cases the de-
molitions are in violation of international law. The Israeli argument
that article 64 permits the implementation of DER 119 despite articles
53 and 33 is without merit. Such an argument ignores the express
provision contained in article 64 which states that the local law should
not be implemented if it represents an "obstacle to the application of
the present Convention. ' 83 It can scarcely be argued that an Occupy-
82. von Glahn, The Protection of Human Rights in Time of Armed Conflicts, 1971 ISR. Y.B.
HuM. RTS. 208, 227.
83. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, at art. 64.
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ing Power may invoke article 64 in order to implement a local law
which violates the standards of articles 53 and 33. Another textual
argument which may be made against the Israeli position is that arti-
cles 53 and 33 contain specific prohibitions against certain practices by
an Occupying Power whereas article 64 contains only a generalized
provision regarding enforcement of the local law subject to the princi-
ples of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Israel should punish only those who are convicted of performing
or conspiring to perform terrorist activities. Buildings should only be
destroyed if it is imperative to do so in order to counter military at-
tacks emanating from the structure. By following such a policy, Israel
would eliminate the legal approbation currently levelled at its imple-
mentation of DER 119. Although its attempts to discourage terrorist
activity are understandable, Israel must implement counter-terrorist
measures which are not in violation of international law. The effec-
tiveness of a policy does not justify its use; otherwise, many draconian
measures undertaken by an Occupying Power to control the local pop-
ulation would be permissible. Israel's demolitions in the Occupied
Territories ignore the plain meaning of the language contained in arti-
cles 53 and 33.
Israel should strive to honor the spirit of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention and thereby remove the shadow which has been cast upon it as
the result of its policy of using demolitions as a deterrence measure.
Following the strictures of international law is not always an easy path
for nations torn by internal conflict or war. The legal guidelines estab-
lished by the Geneva Convention often seem detrimental to the secur-
ity of a nation faced with controlling a hostile population. Yet they
represent the best hope mankind has in guaranteeing the humane
treatment of civilians and safeguarding personal property in times of
strife and conflict. To ignore such provisions sets the progress of man
back a step, back to the disavowed practices of total war. The princi-
ples of the Fourth Geneva Convention are undoubtedly imperfect, but
they represent the best efforts of men who strove to eliminate the ex-
cesses of the last world war. Israel, a nation whose birth was signifi-
cantly influenced by those who had witnessed the abominations of
unprincipled warfare, should surely understand the importance of up-
holding the principles embodied in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
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